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1 Introduction 
Recently, the electric power sector, along with other network industries, has been deregulated 
throughout the world in an effort to introduce market-oriented measures to improve sector 
performance. Typically, in the electricity industry these regulatory reforms have included, 
partially or completely, the following elements: (i) the privatization of public enterprises, (ii) a 
separation between potential competitive (generation and retail supply) and natural monopoly 
segments (distribution and transmission), (iii) the design of competitive markets at both the 
wholesale and retail levels, and (iv) the implementation of performance-based or incentive 
regulatory mechanisms (e.g., price cap regulation via the well-known RPI-X formula) to 
remaining regulated segments in an effort to complement traditional cost-of-service regulation 
(see Joskow (2006) for details on this broader framework). As stated, one important aspect of 
this new regulatory environment is the use of yardstick competition (Schleifer (1985)) or 
performance benchmarking to set the efficiency requirements (i.e., the X-factor) based on a 
relative efficiency assessment. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) provide a survey of the many countries 
implementing such performance benchmarking schemes in their electricity sector.  
The distribution of electricity is one of the activities subject to this regulation. 
Traditionally, convex technologies, both parametric and non-parametric, are being used for this 
benchmarking purpose to define this X-factor representing the extracted information rents. The 
use of such benchmarks based on frontier notions of production technologies and value 
functions is now even well integrated into what can be called applied regulation theory (see the 
Bogetoft (2000) survey) and it is being part and parcel of the handbooks for regulation 
developed by international institutions like the Worldbank (e.g., Coelli et al. (2003)). Examples 
of such studies in the electricity sector are abound (see, e.g., Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006) 
for a distribution study). 
In economic theory, the single main argument against convexity of production 
correspondences is probably related to indivisibilities. For instance, in a series of contributions 
Scarf (1986, 1994) is among the authors forcefully arguing on the importance of indivisibilities 
in selecting among technological options. This general argument has been used to plea in favour 
of using non-convex instead of convex non-parametric technologies by Tone and Sahoo (2003). 
While the general validity of this claim opens up a vast research agenda, we simply contribute to 
the analysis of this controversy by focusing on the impact of convexity in benchmarking 
electricity distribution.
1 
                                                            
1 Non-convexity may also have been neglected because of the theoretical difficulty of designing Walrasian markets 
for integer constrained activities. However, O'Neill et al. (2005a) offer results for markets with non-convexities on 
the existence of market clearing prices and the economic interpretation of strong duality for integer programs. 
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The latter sector is selected given the existence of some general arguments in the 
academic literature pointing to the existence of indivisibilities. In the electricity power industry, 
it is well-known that the lumpiness of large infrastructural investments is pervasive both in 
generation and distribution activities (see Elmaghraby et al. (2004)). The resulting non-
convexities of technologies create enormous problems in defining auction and market 
mechanisms mimicking perfect competition (e.g. Anandalingam, Day and Raghavan (2005)). Of 
particular relevance for our contribution, the discrete nature of network investments in 
transmission capacity and increasing returns to scale are among the main causes of non-
convexities in electricity distribution (see, e.g., O'Neill et al. (2005b) and the survey by 
Brunekreeft, Neuhoff and Newbery (2005)).
2 
To put these general arguments in context, one should realize that the underlying 
technology of an electricity distribution network is discrete in nature and has been gradually 
built over decades in response to the evolving historical economic reality given by changes in 
demand and marked structure. Thus, there is at best piecemeal planning involved in its 
construction. Spain is a pioneer in regulating electricity distribution using an “ideal” engineering 
benchmark network across the country rather than using yardstick competition. Thus, it gives us 
a rare opportunity of studying how an actual electricity distribution network is built and how an 
ideal one could have been built.  
This discussion triggers the question what exactly the empirical impact of convexity is 
when analyzing cost functions in industries where this assumption is debatable. The discrete 
nature of these networks being beyond doubt, the real question at stake is the relevance of 
convexity when comparing costs across these networks. To reassess the convexity property of 
the cost function in electricity distribution, we compare a sample of Spanish distributors 
analysed earlier by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2003) (henceforth GTL) using convex versus non-
convex cost functions with the help of non-parametric specifications developed in Briec, 
Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut (2004) (henceforth BKVE). The comparison between historical 
and ideal Spanish networks with their specific discrete nature could help to assess the 
convenience of the standard economic convexity assumption. 
The structure of this note is as follows. The second section develops the specification of 
technologies and cost functions. Section three first describes the data used by GTL as well as 
their decomposition methodology to assign sources to the observed cost difference between 
actual and ideal networks. The final subsection presents the empirical results for both cost 
                                                            
2 In electricity generation, start-up costs, minimum output levels, and minimum up and down time constraints, among 
others, seem to create non-convexities (see Arroyo and Conejo (2000), Makkonen and Lahdelma (2006), among others). 
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functions estimated using convex and non-convex specifications of technology. A concluding 
section offers some final thoughts.  
 
2.  Cost Functions on Non-convex and Convex Non-Parametric Technologies 
This section introduces the necessary definitions of the convex and non-convex non-parametric 
specifications of the production possibility set, the input distance function and the corresponding 
cost functions (see BKVE for details). To the best of our knowledge, there does not seem to be a 
pair of parametric alternative specifications allowing testing for convexity. Assume there are K 
observations characterised by an input vector x  œ  Ñ
n
+ and an output vector y  œ  Ñ
m
+. The 
production possibility set or technology defines the set of feasible production combinations: S = 
{(x,y) ⏐ x can produce y}. Associated with S, the input set denotes all input vectors x capable of 
producing a given output vector y:  L(y) = {x ⏐ (x,y) ∈  S}. The cost function designates the 
minimum outlays necessary to produce an output vector y given an input price vector w œ Ñ
n
++: 
C(y,w) = min {wx ⏐ x ∈ L(y)}.  
The input distance function offers a complete characterisation of technology and it is 
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The radial measure of input technical efficiency (Ei(x,y)) is simply the inverse of this input distance 
function ( []
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− = y x D y x E i i ). It denotes the proportional reduction in inputs that are feasible 
while maintaining production of a given output vector and it has a cost interpretation. 
A unified algebraic representation of the convex and non-convex technologies is:  
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where  z is the activity vector. These technologies basically impose strong input and output 
disposability and variable returns to scale and differ only in the convexity assumption. 
The radial measure of input technical efficiency Ei(x,y) can be computed on non-convex 
non-parametric technology  ) (y L
NC  using the following closed-form expression: 
() , max min ) , (




















   (3) 
where the better set  ) , ( y x B  of observation (x,y) is defined as follows:  
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{} . , : ) ( ) , ( y y x x ,y x y x B k k k k ≥ ≤ =   ( 4) 
Its computation on a convex non-parametric technology  ) (y L
C   requires solving a linear 
program (see Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994)). The corresponding non-convex cost function 
() ( ) { } y L x x w y w C
NC NC ∈ ⋅ = : min ,  has the following closed-form characterisation: 
() . min , k
y y




   (5) 
Again, computing a cost function corresponding to convex non-parametric technology  ( ) y w C
C ,  
requires solving a linear program (see Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994)). 
The cost function estimated on a convex technology is always lower or equal to one 
estimated using a non-convex technology: 
( ) ( ). , , y w C y w C
NC C ≤    (6) 
The impact of convexity or not of production technology on the cost function has been known 
for a long time. Essentially, only the property of the cost function with respect to changes in 
outputs is at stake: while the cost function is non-decreasing in outputs in general, cost functions 
estimated on convex (non-convex) technologies are furthermore convex (non-convex) in the 
outputs.
3 
Having briefly introduced the methodology necessary for estimating the cost function on 
both convex and non-convex specification of technology, we now turn to a description of the 
sample of Spanish electricity distributors employed in this study. 
 
3.  Spanish Electricity Distributors: Data, Specification Issues, and Empirical Findings 
3.1.  Brief Description of Data and Details on the Ideal Distribution Network 
Starting with a brief description of the data set already employed in GTL, we can highlight the 
following elements. There is in fact access to a pair of data sets. The first one describes the 
actual network as it existed in 1996. The other one describes the ideal engineering network as 
established by the consultants. The former database reflects the historical economic reality 
resulting from many years of managerial responses to changes in demand, network and market 
structure, and regulation based on economic incentives. The latter database reflects an ideal 
network design from scratch by engineers, in view of current technology as well as current and 
projected future demand. It needs no comment that these two databases differ substantially.
4 
                                                            
3 Indeed, already Jacobsen (1970: proposition 5.2) pointed out explicitly that the convexity of the cost function in the 
outputs is linked to the assumption of convexity of the output sets. 
4 Section II in GTL offers some background on the regulation of electricity distribution in Spain. 
IESEG Working Paper Series 2007-ECO-01
5 
Just to provide some more details, the Spanish reference or ideal distribution network 
connects all consumers with the electricity transportation grid around Spain. The relevant 
information about the consumers is given by (i) the geographic location; (ii) the demand for 
power; (iii) the kind of voltage (High, Medium and Low Voltages, denoted as HV, MV and LV); 
and (iv) the peak time demand of power. The model aims at minimizing investments and 
electricity losses (the difference between the amount of electricity entering the network and 
delivered to the consumers) as well a level of quality. Thus, the model decides on the fixed 
assets, the operating cost and the electricity losses of the distribution network.  
Given a geographical zone, the model decides the reference or “ideal” network taking 
into account the characteristics of the zone: geographical location of the consumers, forecasted 
demand, environmental characteristics of the zone, location of the transportation grid, and the 
required level of quality. The spatial model identifies individual locations of HV consumers, but 
consumers of MV and LV are located by sets (i.e., groups of houses such as villages, towns and 
cities). The reference or “ideal” network for Spain is divided by geographical zones (the 
provinces). For each province, the model decides on: (i) LV rural networks, (ii) MV and LV 
urban networks, (iii) networks associated with industrial estates, (iv) MV rural networks, and 
finally (v) networks of transportation and distribution. The latter networks provide electricity to 
HV/MV substations and to HV consumers. This network of HV lines is connected to the actual 
Spanish transportation grid system (see the Appendix for some more details).  
Observe that the ideal network is exclusively based on local information and is very 
discrete in nature. Of course, the same observation applies to the historical network. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to see in the above described structure of these networks any 
mechanism that could imply convexity. This leads us to question the relevance of convexity 
when making benchmarking comparisons across networks.  
In general, the engineering approach covers a wide range of methods that have all in 
common that they employ at least partially hypothetical rather than observed input-output data 
(derived from blueprints, engineering theory, etc.) based upon direct technological information. 
This approach differs widely from simply conservatively estimating parameters and variables in 
a basic engineering production or cost model to extensive optimization and simulation modeling 
of an existing and/or ideal technology (in casu, an electricity distribution network) in all its 
technical details starting from the underlying processes (the latter requiring considerable effort 
and industrial expertise).
5 It is useful to recall that in the economics literature a similar approach 
has been initiated by the seminal article of Chenery (1949), but this research stream has 
                                                            
5 For references to the engineering literature: see the introduction and Ventosa et al. (2005). 
IESEG Working Paper Series 2007-ECO-01
6 
 
3.4. Empirical  Findings 
Table 1 reports the empirical findings on the decomposition of the cost differential. In contrast 
to GTL, we only report descriptive statistics at the sample level rather than results per 
distributor.
7 The first two columns of the upper part of Table 1 reveal that the actual network has 
an operating cost that is about 40% higher than that of the consultancy’s ideal network yielding 
the cost differential in the third column. Thus, the consultancy’s ideal network shows a 
substantial cost saving potential across the board and the decomposition defined above should 
ideally shed some light onto its constituent sources. The crucial question is now to which extent 
the convexity assumption drives any of these results. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Under the traditional convexity hypothesis (upper part of the table), the largest potential 
cost saving is due to the fact that the consultancy’s ideal network proposes lower input prices, 
and the second potential cost saving is attributable to the consultancy’s ideal network being 
leaner. By contrast, the consultancy’s ideal network is substantially less cost efficient than the 
actual network, which neutralizes a substantial part of the potential cost saving from the first 
two sources. 
The two first findings are not surprising, since the consultancy’s network was designed 
solely on the basis of current and projected future demand and without any weight of history. 
However, there are at least two plausible reasons to expect that the consultancy’s ideal network 
is not as cost efficient as the actual network (see GTL). First, the consultancy’s network has 
been designed by engineers in view of obtaining a superior network design, but with less 
concern for its cost efficiency. Second, since the standard cost parameters had not been adjusted 
for productivity changes since 1987 and standard cost reimbursement scheme allocate excess 
revenues to the firm, this provides distributor firms with a powerful incentive to strive for cost 
efficiency. 
Under the non-convexity assumption (lower part of the table), the two main potential 
sources of cost savings remain the same in relative importance, but their absolute amounts are 
reduced. The average network design differential and the input price differential reduce from 2.1 
to 1.6 million and from 3.0 to 2.8 million Euros. Furthermore, the cost disadvantage of the 
consultancy’s ideal network remains, but it has become a very marginal not to say an almost 
negligible factor (with a reduction from -0.8 to -0.1 million Euros on average). Also the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
hypothetical cost functions ( ) , ( y w C e
Λ
a  and  ) , ( y w C a
Λ
e ) are unlikely to coincide in practice, these two first 
decompositions have been combined using an arithmetic mean form in Decomposition 3 (see text). 
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superscript ‘‘e’’ (for engineering). Now, we can define actual costs and the actual cost function 
( ) , ( y w C x w a
Λ
a a a ≥ ⋅ ) and engineering costs and the engineering cost function 
() , ( y w C x w e
Λ
e e e ≥ ⋅ ), whereby  ) , ( y w C a
Λ
a  and  ) , ( y w C e
Λ
e  embody the actual network and input 
prices respectively the consultant’s ideal network and input prices. In addition to these two cost 
functions, we define two hypothetical cost functions to obtain the above decomposition. The 
first cost function  ) , ( y w C e
Λ
a   describes minimal outlays with the actual network and the 
consultancy’s ideal input prices. The second cost function  ) , ( y w C a
Λ
e  describes  minimal 
expenses with an ideally designed network and actual input prices. Recall that output demands 
are identical in both cases, which explains why we do not need any superscript to y in any cost 
function. 
Returning to the observed cost differential between both networks ( e e a a x w x w ⋅ − ⋅ ), the 
objective is to decompose it into three components to identify its underlying sources in an 
economically informative way. The cost differential ( e e a a x w x w ⋅ − ⋅ ) can be decomposed as 
follows: 
al differenti   efficiency - t cos
)]} , ( [ )] , ( {[
al differenti   price input 
)]} , ( ) , ( [ )] , ( ) , ( {[ 2 1
al differenti design  network 
)]} , ( ) , ( [ )] , ( ) , ( {[ 2 1 ) (
y w C x w y w C x w
y w C y w C y w C y w C
y w C y w C y w C y w C x w x w
e
Λ




















a e e a a
− ⋅ − − ⋅ +
− + − +
− + − = ⋅ − ⋅
 
It identifies three sources of cost differences: (i) the network design differential attributes part of 
the cost differential to differences in network design (averaged over actual and ideal input 
prices); (ii) the input price differential assigns a portion of the cost differential to input price 
differences (averaged over the ideal and the actual network’s cost function); and (iii) the cost-
efficiency differential attributes the remainder of the cost differential to cost efficiency 
differences.
6 Estimation of the cost functions involved is straightforward using the methodology 
outlined in section 2.  
                                                            
6 GTL define two options, indicated as Decompositions 1 and 2, and Decomposition 3 averaging both of these. Our 
empirical results focus on this third option since the other decompositions yield very similar results (very much as 
in GTL). In fact, the first two decompositions share a common cost-efficiency differential, but they have different 
network design and input price differentials. The latter phenomenon explains taking the arithmetic average 
(between curly brackets) of both components (which are themselves between square brackets). The first 
decomposition evaluates the (i) network design differential at actual input prices and (ii) the input price differential 
using the ideal network’s cost function. The second decomposition evaluates the (i) network design differential at 
ideal input prices and (ii) the input price differential using the actual network’s cost function. Since both 
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3.4. Empirical  Findings 
Table 1 reports the empirical findings on the decomposition of the cost differential. In contrast 
to GTL, we only report descriptive statistics at the sample level rather than results per 
distributor.
7 The first two columns of the upper part of Table 1 reveal that the actual network has 
an operating cost that is about 40% higher than that of the consultancy’s ideal network yielding 
the cost differential in the third column. Thus, the consultancy’s ideal network shows a 
substantial cost saving potential across the board and the decomposition defined above should 
ideally shed some light onto its constituent sources. The crucial question is now to which extent 
the convexity assumption drives any of these results. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Under the traditional convexity hypothesis (upper part of the table), the largest potential 
cost saving is due to the fact that the consultancy’s ideal network proposes lower input prices, 
and the second potential cost saving is attributable to the consultancy’s ideal network being 
leaner. By contrast, the consultancy’s ideal network is substantially less cost efficient than the 
actual network, which neutralizes a substantial part of the potential cost saving from the first 
two sources. 
The two first findings are not surprising, since the consultancy’s network was designed 
solely on the basis of current and projected future demand and without any weight of history. 
However, there are at least two plausible reasons to expect that the consultancy’s ideal network 
is not as cost efficient as the actual network (see GTL). First, the consultancy’s network has 
been designed by engineers in view of obtaining a superior network design, but with less 
concern for its cost efficiency. Second, since the standard cost parameters had not been adjusted 
for productivity changes since 1987 and standard cost reimbursement scheme allocate excess 
revenues to the firm, this provides distributor firms with a powerful incentive to strive for cost 
efficiency. 
Under the non-convexity assumption (lower part of the table), the two main potential 
sources of cost savings remain the same in relative importance, but their absolute amounts are 
reduced. The average network design differential and the input price differential reduce from 2.1 
to 1.6 million and from 3.0 to 2.8 million Euros. Furthermore, the cost disadvantage of the 
consultancy’s ideal network remains, but it has become a very marginal not to say an almost 
negligible factor (with a reduction from -0.8 to -0.1 million Euros on average). Also the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
hypothetical cost functions ( ) , ( y w C e
Λ
a  and  ) , ( y w C a
Λ
e ) are unlikely to coincide in practice, these two first 
decompositions have been combined using an arithmetic mean form in Decomposition 3 (see text). 
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aggregate results at the level of the country (see sum in last line) confirm that the sources of the 
observed cost differential are much smaller under non-convexity.  
The explanation behind this last result is simple: whereas in the convex case only 20 and 
15 distributors out of 68 are efficient in the actual and ideal network specifications, these 
numbers increase to 60 and 64 in the non-convex case. Just to elaborate a bit on the difference 
between both specifications, Figure 1 plots the kernel densities of cost efficiencies (= minimal 
costs/actual costs ≤ 1) for the actual network using convex and non-convex specifications. 
Clearly, the differences are very pronounced. Figures for the other cost functions involved in the 
decompositions look very similar (therefore, these are suppressed). 
< Figure 1 about here> 
To formally test for this difference between both densities, the test–statistic of Li (1996) 
(see Fan and Ullah (1999) for refinements) is computed which is valid for dependent and 
independent variables alike. Under the null hypothesis that both distributions are identical and 
the alternative hypothesis that they are different, this test statistic asymptotically follows a 
standard normal-distribution (for small samples, a bootstrap approximation can be employed).
8 
This test statistic for the cost functions on the actual and ideal networks amounts to 16.64 resp. 
25.52 which surpasses the 1% significance level (critical value 2.33) widely. Similar results are 
obtained for the hypothetical cost functions (therefore, these are again suppressed). Thus, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected and it is safe to conclude that convex and non-convex estimates 
yield markedly different results.  
The gist of this story is that for the Spanish regulation of electricity distribution via an 
engineering benchmarking grid model, the potential cost savings are mainly due to the fact that 
the consultancy’s ideal network proposes lower input prices and that it is simply leaner in 
design. The initial important cost efficiency disadvantage of the ideal network largely disappears 
under non-convexity. Irrespective of the relative advantages of using either economic or 
engineering benchmarking models for regulatory purposes, the latter result increases the bite of 
this engineering benchmarking model. 
Without over-interpreting the current result, we simply note that convexity could play a 
role in at least partly settling the historical debate on the relative merits of economic and 
engineering approaches to production (e.g., see the debate between Wibe (1984, 1986) and 
Marsden and Pingry (1986) and Smith (1986)), since it may well bring both approaches closer in 
line. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 To compare results, please contrast the last line in Table 4 of GTL with our sum results. 
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4. Conclusions 
Despite the fact that the impact of convexity of the technology on the cost function has been known 
for years (see Jacobsen (1970)), very few if any empirical applications have been documenting this 
impact. This study has employed the recent models developed by BKVE to test for the impact of 
convexity in regulatory benchmarking in the electricity distribution sector. First, we have provided 
some evidence on the non-convex nature of electricity distribution through the description of the 
way that existing and “ideal” electricity distribution networks are built. Second, we find that cost 
estimates differ significantly according to a non-parametric test statistic.  
It is important that these empirical findings are corroborated by complementary research 
both in general production applications and in electricity distribution in particular, eventually 
employing other test approaches to evaluate the convexity axiom.
9 In the longer run, these results 
could eventually lead to a reconsideration of the convexity assumption in applied production 
analysis in general and in its use in regulatory practice in particular. In consequence, the regulation 
of other network industries (gas utilities, telecommunication companies, water distribution, etc.) 
should equally reconsider its choice of benchmarking model.  
Some of the consequences of this specification issue for regulatory benchmarking are 
rather straightforward to anticipate. On the one hand, the demands on benchmarking in terms of 
sample sizes become more difficult when opting for non-convex approaches, since larger sample 
sizes are needed to estimate monotone rather than convex hull boundaries (see BKVE).
10. On 
the other hand, it may well become more difficult to manipulate frontier-based regulatory 
schemes since the impact of each single observation on the frontier is smaller in the non-convex 
case. Whether opting for non-convex benchmark strategies would have a mitigating impact on 
the gaming of the regulator remains to be seen. Jamasb, Nillesen and Pollitt (2003) offer a survey 
among regulators on these vulnerability issues in yardstick competition and Jamasb, Nillesen and 
Pollitt (2004) provide some examples of manipulating benchmarking models in regulation in 
practice.  
 
Appendix: Additional Information on the Ideal Network 
The “ideal” engineering network is built by taking decisions per province about the following five 
kinds of installations: 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
8 Further details on its application in a similar setting can be found in Kumar and Russell (2002). 
9 Eventually, by extension similar studies in electricity generation may be needed as well. 
10  An obvious solution is the development of international databases and/or the increase in the frequency of 
observations (e.g., quarterly versus annual observations) in an effort to increase the bite of regulation. Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2003) review the possibilities and potential pitfalls related to international benchmarking in the electricity 
sector. 
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(i) LV rural network: 
Villages or towns with less of 350 houses only need one substation transforming MV to LV. A 
radial network in tree form connects them. This network is always aerial and in the towns and 
villages the lines are fixed on the facade. 
(ii) MV and LV urban network: 
For villages, towns and cities of more than 350 houses, the model calculates the number of HV/MV 
and MV/LV substations that are necessary. The lines could be aerial or underground depending on 
the characteristics of the town or city. The lines could be MV or LV. 
(iii) Network associated to industrial estates: 
The model calculates the necessary number of HV/MV and MV/LV substations. The lines could be 
aerial or underground depending on the characteristics of the industrial estate. Net and tree 
networks connect and deliver the electricity that could be MV or LV. 
(iv) MV rural network: 
This is the aerial network that connects all towns and villages with a demand for power of less than 
10 MW and also MV consumers which are not located in industrial estates or inside towns, villages 
or cities. The model determines the number of HV/MV and MV/LV substations that are needed. 
These lines are MV. 
(v) Network for Transportation of Distribution: 
This network provides the electricity to HV/MV substations and HV consumers. This network is 
connected to the HV transportation grid system and is always aerial. The lines are HV. 
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Figure 1: Kernel densities (with boundary correction) of cost efficiency on convex and non-
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Convex Mean  15.4 11.0 4.4 2.1 3.0 -0.8 1.5 2.3
 Trimmed  Mean  14.6 10.8 3.8 1.9 2.7 -0.7 1.4 2.1
 St.  Dev.  17.5 8.5 11.1 4.9 6.0 2.9 1.9 2.6
 Min  0.2 0.4 -5.0 -4.1 -3.3 -14.8 0.0 0.0
 Max  84.9 37.2 50.6 25.8 28.0 7.1 8.5 14.8
 Sum  1048.2 749.9 298.3 145.6 205.9 -53.2 102.7 155.9
Non-Convex  Mean      1.6 2.8 -0.1 0.1 0.1
  Trimmed  Mean      1.5 2.5 -0.0 0.0 0.1
  St.  Dev.      6.1 6.5 0.8 0.3 0.7
  Min     -13.4 -4.3 -4.7 0.0 0.0
  Max     25.8 27.8 1.6 1.7 4.8
  Sum     110.9 191.2 -3.9 5.0 8.8
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